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I. INTRODUCTION 
This outline was prepared by Howard M. Zaritsky. Howard carefully compiled insightful 
cases and comments, and I am greatly indebted to him for allowing nie to use his outline. 
The past twelve months have witnessed substantial changes in the estate, gift and 
generation-skipping transfer (GST) ta.--ces and in the income tax laws relating to estate plruming. 
This outline summarizes the legislation, regulations, revenue mlings and procedures, 
regular decisions of the Tax Comt, the Claims Comt and the courts of appeals, as well as 
. selected district comi and Tax Court memorandum decisions, private rulings, notices, 
announcements and other Service and Treasmy documents from the past year. 1 This outline 
includes those developments reported publicly from April1, 2013 through April28, 2014. 
Each category is divided by Internal Revenue ·Code section, except that special 
consolidated discussions examine the various developments relating to the taxation of family 
pruinerships and LLCs and charitable remainder trusts. 
II. ESTATE TAXES 
A. Code§ 2010. Unified Credit; Portability 
1. IRS Permits Late Estate Tax Returns to Elect Portability for Estates 
of Decedents Dying Before 2014. Rev. Proc. 2014-18, 2014-7 I.R.B. 
513 (Feb. 10, 2014) 
Section 2010(c)(5)(A) specifically provides that a portability election is 
effective only if made on a Fotm 706 that is filed within the time pre-
scribed by law (including extensions) for filing such return. Temp. Regs. 
§ 20.2010-2T(a)(l) states that an estate that elects pmtability will be con-
sidered to be required to file a return under Section 6018(a), even if the 
gross estate is below the filing threshold ($5.340 million in 2014). Ac-
cordingly, the due date of an estate tax retmn required to elect portability 
is nine months after the decedent's date of death, or the last day of the pe-
riod covered by an extension (if an extension of time for filing has been 
obtained). Regs. § 301.9100-3 allows the IRS to grant discretionary ex-
tensions of the time in which to make elections whose due dates are pre-
1 Private letter mlings (PLRs) and technical advice memoranda (TAMs) are not legal precedents. Code § 
6110(k)(3). They may, however, show how the Service might address a similar case, and they have been cited and 
discussed by several courts. See, e.g., Wolpaw v. Comm'r, 747 F.3d 787 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'g T.C. Memo. 1993-
322 (taxpayers can rely on 20-year old PLR, absent definitive regulations); Estate of Blacliford v. Comm 'r, 77 T.C. 
1246 (1982) (noting that the Service litigation position was contnuy to a prior PLR); Xerox Corp. v. U.S., 656 F.2d 
659 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (stating that PLRs are useful in ascettaining the scope of the doctrine adopted by the Service and 
demonstrating its continued and consistent application by the Service); Fanning v. U.S., 568 F.Supp. 823 (B.D. 
Wash. 1983) (noting that a distinction between the facts of the instant case and those of prior cases had been cited in 
· a TAM, and that TAMs are often relied upon by the courts). 
All references to "Code" are to the Intemal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended to date, unless otherwise 
specifically indicated. References to "Regs" are to the regulations of the Treasury Department, unless otherwise 
.specifically indicated. 
scribed by regulation or other administrative guidance, rather than by the 
Code. The due date for electing portability for those estates required to 
file an estate tax return under Section6018(a) is prescribed by statute, but 
the due date for electing portability for those estates not otherwise re-
quired to file an estate tax retmn is provided by regulation. Temp. Treas. 
Reg. § 20.2010-2T(a). Therefore, the executor of an estate that is under 
the filing threshold should be able to seek a discretionary extension of the 
time for making the portability election under Regs. § 301.9100-3. This 
discretionary relief will be granted if the taxpayer establishes to the satis-
faction of the Commissioner that the taxpayer acted reasonably and in 
good faith and that the grant of relief will not prejudice the interests of the 
government. Normally, relief under Regs. § 301.9100w3 requires that the 
taxpayer file a request for a private letter niling, and pay a substantial fil-
ing fee. Rev. Proc. 2014-18, however, provides a simpler alternate proce-
dure for obtaining a discretionary extension of the time for flling an estate 
tax return to elect portability, if the estate was not otherwise required to 
file an estate tax return. Rev. Proc. 2014-18 applies if: (a) The taxpayer is 
the executor of the estate of a decedent who died after December 31, 2010 
and before January 1, 2014, leaving a smviving spouse; (b) The smviving 
spouse was a citizen or resident of the United States on the date of death; 
(c) The taxpayer is not required to file an estate tax retm11 under Section 
6018(a) (as determined based on the value of the gross estate and adjusted 
taxable gifts, without regard to portability; (d) The taxpayer did not file a 
timely estat~ tax return to elect portability; (e) The ta-x:payer files a com-
plete and properly-prepared federal estate tax return on or before Decem-
ber 31, 2014 (An estate tax return is considered complete and properly 
prepared if it is prepared in accordance with Temp. Regs. § 20.2010-
2T(a)(7)); and (f) The taxpayer states at the top of the retmn that it is 
"FILED PURSUANT TO REV. PROC. 2014-18 TO ELECT PORTABIL-
ITY UNDER§ 2010(c)(5)(A)." A taxpayer who meets these requirements 
will be deemed to meet the requirements for relief under Regs. § 
301.9100-3 and will be allowed an extension of the time for electing p01t-
ability. For purposes of electing portability, the taxpayer's estate tax re-
turn will be considered to have been timely filed in accordance with the 
regulations. The taxpayer will receive an estate tax closing letter ac-
knowledging receipt of the taxpayer's Form 706. A taxpayer who does 
not meet all of these requirements can still seek a discretionary extension 
of the time within which to elect pmtability, by filing a private ruling re-
quest under Regs. § 301.9100-3. See Rev. Proc. 2014~1, 2014~1 I.R.B. 1 
(or its successors). This would apply to estates of decedents who died af-
ter December 31, 2013. A taxpayer who actually flied a timely estate tax 
retmn does not usually need to take advantage of Rev. Proc. 2014-18, be-
cause the mere filing of the retmn is deemed to be an election of portabil-
ity. Temp. Treas. Regs. § 20.2010-2T(a)(3)(i)). A timely return can avoid 
the election of pmtability only by making an affirmative statement that 
portability is not desired. Id. Relief under Rev. Pro c. 2014-18 is "null and 
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void" if it is ultimately determined that the taxpayer was required to file an 
estate tax return under Section 6018(a), based on the value of the grosses-
tate and taking into account any taxable gifts. The smviving spouse (or his 
or her executor) must file a claim for a credit or refund of an overpayment 
of tax by reason of a portability election made on a late return pursuant to 
Rev. Proc. 2014-8, before the regular limitations period of two-years after 
the payment of the tax or three-years after the filing of the retum. Rev. 
Proc. 2014-18 is effective January 27, 2014. Until January 1, 2015, no 
private rulings under Regs.§ 301.9100-3 will be issued for an extension of 
the time to elect portability with respect to an estate that qualifies under 
Rev. Proc. 2014-18. An executor who has a private letter ruling request 
pending on January 27, 2014 and who would otherwise qualify under this 
revenue procedure may rely on the procedure, withdraw the letter ruling 
request and-receive a refund of its user fee. Such ruling requests will be 
processed, however, unless the executor withdraws the request before 
March 10, 2014, or the earlier date on which the letter ruling is actually is~ 
sued. 
2. Basic Exclusion Amount Adjusted for Inflation. Rev. Proc. 2013~35, § 
3.32, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537 (Nov. 18, 2013) 
The IRS annual inflation adjustments for tax year 2014 include an increase 
of the basic exclusion amount to $5.34 million, from $5.25 million in 
2013. 
3. Extensions Granted to Make Portability Election. PLR 201414001 
(April4, 2014); 201410013 (March 7, 2014); 201406004 (Feb. 7, 2014); 
201407002 (Feb. 14, 2014) 
The IRS granted an estate a discretionary extension to make a portability 
election m1der Section 2010(c)(5)(A) to an estate that failed to file an es-
tate tax retum and that was below the filing threshold. In each case, the 
decedent's executor did not file a Form 706 to make the portability elec-
tion before the required deadline. The estate discovered its failure to elect 
portability after the due date for making the election. The personal repre-
sentative represented that the value of the decedent's gross estate was less 
than the bask exclusion amount in the year of death and that during his 
lifetime, the decedent made no taxable gifts. 
The IRS granted an extension · of time pursuant· to Regs. § 
301.91 00~3 to elect portability of the decedent's DSUE amount pursuant to 
Section 2010(c)(5)(A). The IRS noted that Temp. Regs. § 20.2010~ 
2T( a)(l) provides that an estate that elects portability will be considered, 
for purposes of estate tax pmposes to be required to file a retmn under 
Section 6018(a), so that the due date of the return required to elect porta-
bility is 9 months after the decedent's date of death or ·the last day of the 
period covered by an extension (if an extension of time for filing has been 
obtained). Regs. § 301.9100-l(c) provides that the IRS may grant a rea-
3 
sonable extension of time to make a regulatory election, if the taxpayer 
provides evidence to establish to the satisfaction of the IRS that the tax-
. payer acted reasonably and in good faith, and that granting relief will not 
prejudice the interests of the govemment. A taxpayer is deemed to have 
acted reasonably and in good faith if the taxpayer reasonably 1;elied on a 
qualified tax professional, and the professional failed to make, or advise 
the ta'\:payer to malce, the election. Regs. § 301.9100-3(b)(1)(v). Temp. 
Regs. § 20.2010-2T(a) specify that the portability election must be made 
on a timely-filed Form 706, and for estates not required to file an estate 
tax return under Section 6018, the portability election is a regulatory elec-
tion. Therefore, the IRS granted an extension of time of 120 days from the 
date of this letter in which to elect portability undet Section. 201 0( c)( 5). 
Note. This is less important during 2014, in light of Rev. Proc. 
2014-18,2014-7 I.R.B. 513 (Feb. 10, 2014). 
B. Code §§ 2031, 2032, 2032A and 7520. Valuation 
1. No Discounts Allowed for Marital Trust Assets When Trust Distribu-
tions Had been Frozen by Trustee or For Suits Against the Decedent's 
Estate and the Marital Trusts. Estate of Foster v. Comm=r, _ 
Fed.Appx. _, 2014 WL 1229928 (9th Cir. March 26, 2014), a.ff'g T.C. 
Memo. 2011-95 
The estate of the decedent, Ellen D. Foster, was involved in complex liti-
gation stemming from the collapse ofF&G, a successful mail-order horti-
culture business founded by her husband, Thomas S. Foster, that had re~ 
lied heavily on a sweepstakes program as part of its direct mail advertis-
ing. In 1995, Thomas2 sold most of his shares to the company=s ESOP, 
which bought them with a $70 million loan from F&G, which had, in tum, 
borrowed the money from four institutional lenders. Thomas, who then 
died in 1996, leaving his estate to three marital trusts for the decedent's 
lifetime benefit. Ellen could withdraw all of the principal of one trust 
(Marital Trust# 3) at any time. Northern Trust Company and Ellen were 
the co-trustees of the marital trusts and togethei· could invade principal for 
Ellen's benefit. In 1998, F&G began experiencing financial trouble, its 
earnings declined, and it fell into violation of the financial covenants of 
the ESOP loans. The ESOP lenders (including Northern Tmst) asked 
F&G to restn1cture the ESOP loans, which had been unsecured, to give the 
lenders a security interest in F&G's assets. Ellen withdrew $12 million 
from Marital Trust# 3, and then lent $6.8 million to F&G. The ESOP 
beneficiaries sued U.S. Trust and Thomas (and Ellen, as executrix of 
Thomas's estate), for breach of fiduciary duty. Northem Trust unilaterally 
froze Ellen's right to withdraw the principal of Marital Tmst # 3. h1 2003, 
2 References to parties by their first names are for convenience only, and are not to indicate either disrespect or a 
personal relationship between the party and the author. 
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the court granted summary judgment to Ellen, because her Thomas's es-
tate had been closed and no judgment could be enforced against her in her 
·fiduciary capacity. The comi left open the possibility that the plaintiffs 
could proceed against Ellen as a co-tmstee of the marital trusts, if they 
could establish that Thomas had committed a breach of fiduciary duty. 
The court later held for the defendants, finding no such breach. The ESOP 
plaintiffs appealed to the Comt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which 
ultimately affirmed. Ellen died while the appeal was pending. Her co-
executors and the co-tmstees of the marital tmsts entered into a settlement 
agreement whereby the ESOP plaintiffs released their claims against the 
estate. The decedent's estate also sued both Northern Trust and an attor-
ney for breach of fiduciary duty, conflicts of interest, and malpractice, 
with respect to the prior transactions. The estate informed the IRS that the 
value of these claims were additionaJ assets of the estate. The suit against 
the attomey was later settled for $850,000 and the suit against Northern 
Trust was settled for $17 million. The estate valued the marital trust's 
with a 29 p_ercent discount for the risks of litigation respecting the suits 
against the decedent and the trusts. The estate valued the lawsuit at 
$33,000. The IRS assessed a deficiency based on the inclusion in the 
gross estate of the value of the claims against the former attorney and 
Northern Tmst, and denial of the deduction for the value of the claims 
against the decedent. · 
The Tax Court (Judge Cohen), held that in valuing the marital 
trusts for estate tax purposes, the tmst assets were not subject to discount 
for hazards of litigation, nor were they subject to discounts for lack of 
marketability and control as result of a freeze imposed by co-tmstee on 
withdrawal of trust assets. The court noted that the litigation could not 
have affected a buyer;:::;s rights in the marital trust assets, because the dis-
trict court had already mled in favor of the decedent before her death. The 
estate could, therefore, have transferred the marital trust assets to a buyer 
free of the claim, because the ESOP beneficiaries had not filed a stay of 
judgment pending appeal. The comt also valued the claim by the dece-
dent=s estate against the fmmer attorney and Northern Trust at $930,000, 
rejecting both the IRS's claimed $5.1 million valuation and the estate's 
claimed $33,000 valuation. The court held that the estate could deduct its 
actual litigation expenses tmder Section2053. 
The Ninth Circuit (Judges Callahan, Smith and Hellerstein) af-
filmed per curiam, in an unpublished opinion, holding that the Tax Court 
had not erred in refusing to apply discounts for hazards of litigation, lack 
of control, or lack of marketability, noting that the plaintiffs in the lawsuit 
did not seek to recover specific, unique assets from the defendants, and the 
lawsuit did not cloud the title of the trust assets. A hypothetical buyer of 
the trust assets would not, the court noted, become a defendant in the law-
suit, so there was no basis for a hazards of litigation discount. Citing 
Shackleford v. United States, 262 FJd 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). Simi-
larly, the court sustained the Tax Court's refusal to apply discounts for 
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lack of control and lack of marketability, because while there the freeze on 
distributions from the trust was not being strictly enforced. Finally, the 
·court agreed that the Tax Court had properly rejected the estate's argmnent 
that the estimated date-of-death value of the ESOP beneficiaries' lawsuit 
was deductible as a claim against the estate, noting that the lawsuit was 
disputed on the date of death, and that post-death events may be consid-
ered in computing the allowable deduction. See Estate of Saunders v. 
Comm'r, _F.3d_, 2014 WL 949246, at *4 (9th Cir., 2014). 
2. Holding Company Valued Under Net Asset Value Method, Rather 
than Capitalized Income; Limited Discount for Built-In Capital Gain 
Allowed .. Estate of Richmond v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2014-26 (Feb. 
11, 2014) 
At the time of her death, Helen P. Richmond owned a 23.44-percent inter-
est in Pearson Holding Company (PHC), a 76-year-old family-owned in-
vestment holding C corporation, the assets of which on the date of death 
were over $52 million of publicly traded securities. The company paid 
dividends annually to its shareholders. Were the underlying securities 
sold on the date of death, the company would recognize a $18 million cap-
ital gains tax. The turn-over of the company's holdings was quite slow, 
averaging only 1.4 percent per year. The decedent's estate had its ac-
countants value the stock, and the accountants applied the capitalized div-
idend approach to produce a $3.1 million value for the decedent's interest. 
The accountant was not a certified valuation expert and provided the estate 
with an unsigned draft report docun1enting his conclusions. Although the 
estate never· received a signed final report, it, nevertheless~ used the re-
pmt' s value conclusion for its estate tax filing. On examination, the IRS 
valued the company under the net asset valuation approach, which valued 
the decedent's interest at $9.2 million. The IRS also declined to allow a 
discount for· the built-in capital gains tax. The IRS assessed a $2.9 million 
deficiency and a 40-percent gross valuation misstatement penalty. 
The Tax Court (Judge Gustafson) held that the value of the dece-
dent's stock was $6.5 million, and sustained the imposition of an accura-
cy-related penalty. At trial, the estate's expert (a different expert from the 
one on whose work the estate tax return had been based) applied the capi-
talized dividend approach and valued the decedent's interest at just over 
$5 million, and then applied a net asset valuation as corroboration. The 
IRS's expert applied a net asset value approach, producing a $7.3 million 
value for the decedent's interest, after a 6-percent discount for lack of con-
trol, a 15-percent built-in gain tax liability discount, and a 21-percent dis-
count for lack of marketability. The comt reJected the capitalization-of-
dividends method, because it relies entirely on estimates of future earn-
ings, whereas the net asset valuation method relies on "concrete and relia-
ble" actual market prices publicly traded securities constituting the com-
pany's portfolio. Fmthermore, the capitalization-of-dividends approach 
assumes that a potential investor will look only at the potential dividend 
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stream, but any reasonable investor would recognize that the company's 
assets are completely marketable and liquid, and that they are worth $52 
million. With respect to the built-in gain discount, the court refused to use 
a dollar-for-dollar discount "in a case like the present one," presumably 
because the·assets were entirely publicly-traded securities and the compa-
ny sold them only sparingly. The court rejected both the estate's and the 
IRS's methods of calculating the discount, holding that the better approach 
was to assume a 20- to 30-year holding period, based on the average turn-
ove.r of the securities, and adjusting the discount for the time over which 
the assets would be sold. The court· found the IRS $7.8 million discount 
closer to the mark. The court then allowed a 7.75-percent discount for 
lack of control and a 32.1-percent discount for lack of marketability, es-
sentially averaging the discmmts from various studies cited by the IRS and 
the estate. The court also sustained the accur.acy related penalty under 
Section 6662, finding the estate failed to demonstrate good faith or rea-
sonable cause, because it used an unsigned draft report prepared by its ac-
countant as the basis for its valuation, and because the accountant was not 
a certified appraiser. 
Note. The court is correct that holding companies are traditionally 
valued by the net asset valuation method, and that this seems especially 
reasonable when the underlying assets are readily marketable. On the 
built-in gain discount, however, the court's approach differs from that 
adopted in Estate of Dunn v. Comm 'r, TC Memo. 2000-12, rev 'd andre- . 
manded, 30.1 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002); Estate of Jelke v. Comm 'r, TC 
Memo. 2005-131, rev'd and remanded, 507 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007), 
reh'g en bane denied, 277 Fed. Appx. 977 (Table) (11th Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied, 555 U.S. 826 (2008); and Estate of Jameson v. Comm 'r, TC 
Memo. 1999-43. · 
3. Tax Court Values LLC Interest as Membership Interest, Rather than 
Assignee Interest, and Excludes Taxpayer's Appraisal For Not Com-
plying With Expert Witness Rules. Estate of Tanenblatt v. Comm'r, 
T.C. Memo. 2013-263 (Nov. 18, 2013) 
Diane Tanenblatt's estate included the assets owned by her revocable 
trust, including a 16.667-percent interest in an LLC that held as its princi-
pal asset a 10-story commercial building in New York City. The estate 
obtained professional appraisals of the underlying real estate and the LLC 
interests. The property appraisal valued the real estate at $20.6 million, 
and the LLC appraisal valued the 16.667-percent interest with a 20-
percent discount for lack of control and a 35-percent discount for lack of 
marketability, resulting in a net value of $1.79 million for the estate's LLC 
interest. The IRS accepted the value of the underlying property, but re-
duced the discounts to 10 percent for lack of control and 20 percent for 
lack of marketability, resulting in a value of $2.48 million for the LLC in-
terest. The estate then retained another appraiser to revalue the LLC inter-
est, and she reduced it:? value to $1.04 million. The estate refened to the 
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second appraisal in and attached a copy of the second appraisal to its Tax 
Court petition. At trial, the estate could not obtain the testimony of the 
second appraiser, but it argued that attaching the appraisal to its petition 
constituted a stipulation by the IRS to it as evidence. 
The Tax Comi (Judge Halpem) refused to admit the second ap-
praisal into evidence, because the estate did not submit and serve a copy of 
the appraisal repo1i, as required by Rule 143(g), Tax Coirrt Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure, and the comt's standing pretrial order. The comi stat-
ed that the estate's counsel told the court that the estate was embroiled in a . 
fee dispute with the appraiser, and could not get the appraiser to testify. 
The court stated that the appraisal could not be admitted unless the ap- · 
praiser testified and was subject to cross-examination and that Tax Court 
Rule 91 does not require that the IRS stipulate to an appraisal merely be-
cause it was attached to the petition. The court held that the rules on stipu-
lations do not overrule the rules on expeli testimony, and that the couti 
always has the final authority to decide what is acceptable expe1i testimo~ 
ny. The comi then accepted the opinion of the IRS's expert regarding the 
value of the. underlying prope1iy, and allowed discom1ts of 10 percent for 
lack of control and 26 percent for lack of marketability, resulting in a $2.3 
million valltation for the estate's LLC interest. The comi also held that the 
estate's interest was a membership i:ntetest, rather than an assignee's inter~ 
est, despite the fact that the LLC operating agreement stated that a non~ 
family member transferee could not become a member without the unani-
mous approval of all of the members, and despite the fact that the decedent 
had transferred her membership interest to her revocable trust. The comi 
noted that Section 2038' includes the assets of the revocable trust in the de-
cedent's gross estate as if she had owned them herself. 
4. Tax. Court Rejects Estate's Valuation of Controlling Interest in LLC 
Holding Liquid Assets. Estate of Koons v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2013-
94 (April9, 2013) 
The decedent, John F. Koons, III, created Central Investments Corp~, 
which established and ran a soft drinks vending machine business. He 
made a large series of gifts of stock of Central to various family members, 
including his four children, his many grandchildren, and his three ex-
wives. Less than three months before his death, the decedent sold the op-
erations to Pepsi for $400 million, to settle a dispute with the soft-drink: 
company. Central Investments then created Central Investments, LLC 
("the LLC"), to hold and invest the sales proceeds. The shareholders of 
Central Investments entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement that: (a) re-
quired-the company to distribute the LLC membership interests to the 
shareholders; (b) required the redemption of the interests of several of the 
donees after the decedent's death; (c) limited discretionary distributions to 
30 percent of"the excess of 'distributable cash;'" (d) permitted removal of 
the 30-percent limitation by a majority vote; -and (e) required a 75-percent 
vote for any member to transfer his or her interests to a non-family mem-
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ber. The redemptions left the decedent's estate with a 70.42-percent vot-
ing interest in the LLC, which then held approximately $351 million of as-
sets, of which $322 million was in cash, and had a net asset value, after li-
abilities, of approximately $318 million. The estate valued its interests in 
the LLC with a 31.7-percent discount (a 26.6~percent discount for lack of 
marketability, a four-percent discount for post-sale contingent liabilities, 
and a three-percent discount for the 75-percent vote required to transfer in-
terests outside ofthe family). 
The Tax Court (Judge Morrison) held for tb,e IRS, finding that the 
appmpriate discount was 7. 5 percent, rather than 31.7 percent, and that the 
loan interest was not deductible. The court strongly favored and adopted 
the views of the IRS's expert, Prof. Mukesh Bajaj, ignored the 30-percent 
discretionary distribution limitation, be.cause a simple majority vote could · 
remove it He also noted that the LLC's underlying assets were over-
whelmingly liquid, so a 70.42-percent owner could distribute most of 
these assets without liquidating the entity. These facts made the typical 
restricted stock transaction studies inapplicable, the IRS expeli contended, 
leaving an appropriate discount of 7.5 percent. The comt noted that the 
estate's expert failed to consider that the discretionary distribution limita-
tions could be overcome with a simple majority vote allowing the 70.42-
percent owner to distribute much of the underlying liquid assets. The 
comt stated that the IRS's expert's views were based on "experience and 
connnon sense," and that he anived at the more accurate valuation, in part 
because (a) the estate's expe1t used a regression equation derived from an 
evaluation of 88 businesses engaged in mainly active businesses as op-
posed to holding cash assets; (b) the estate's expe1t explained only one-
third of the variation in the discounts in the ownership interests in the 88 
companies; (c) the estate's calculation involved ownership of minority in-
terests; and (d) the estate's expe1t overestimated the relationship between 
block size and the valuation discount. 
5. Special Use Farm Value Interest Rates Set for 2012 and 2013. Rev. 
Rul. 2013-19, 2013-39 I.R.B. 240 (Sept. 23, 2013) 
The interest rates by farm credit system territories to be used in computing 
the special use value of farm real property for which an election is made 
m1der Section 2032A are listed for estates of decedents dying in 2013. 
6. Section 2032A Limitation Adjusted for Inflation. Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 
§ 3.33, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537 (Nov. 18, 2013) 
An estate can reduce the estate tax value of qualifying real property used 
in a farm· or business and valued under Section 2032A, by up to 
$1,090,000 for estates of decedents dying in 2014. 
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C. Code § 2036-2038. Retained Life Estate or Power to Alter Beneficial Enjoy-
ment 
Assets Transferred to GRAT and QPRT Included in Deceased Grantor's 
Gross Estate Und.er Section 2036(a). Estate of Trombetta v. Comm'r, T.C. 
Memo. 2013-234 (Oct. 21, 2013) 
Helen A. Trombetta created a 15-year GRAT and a 15-year QPRT. The GRAT 
was requhed to pay Helen $75~000 a year~ increased by four percent per annum, 
for 15 years, and then distribute the remainder to Helen's children or grandchil-
dren. The trustees could also distribute any excess income above the annuity ob-
ligation to Helen. During the tenn of the trust, the payments were most often in 
amounts other than the required annuity, either larger or smaller. In 2005, Helen 
concluded that her health was failing and so she unilaterally reduced the . trust 
terms to 156 months. Helen's QPRT also was to continue originally for 180 
months, and at this time Helen amended the QPR T to requite that the trust create 
a "charitable remainder unitary trust." The trustee of the QPRT did, after Helen's 
death, create a charitable remainder unitrust with a five-year term and a 19.9105-
percent unitrust amount. 
The Tax Court (Judge Cohen) held that the assets of the two trusts were 
includible in Helen's gross estate under Section 2036(a) and 2035, because of her 
interests in the trusts. The court held that the transfer to the GRAT was not abo-
na fide sale for adequate and full consideration, because the consideration was not 
equal to the 'value of the transfened assets (as proven by the gift tax return) and 
because the transfers were not a bona fide sale. The transfers were not bona fide 
sales because the trust was prepared without any meaningful negotiation or bar-
gaining; Helen dictated the fmm and operation of the trust and exercised control 
over the trust~ s activities. Also, there was no legitimate and significant nontax 
reasons for the transfer. The court also held that Helen impliedly retained the 
right to possession or enjoyment of the entire GRAT trust fund, noting that she 
made all decisions with respect to the trust assets and the co-trustees generally did 
whatever she directed them to do. Furthermore, Helen had sole signatory authori-
ty with respect to the disposition of the properties, and she had 50 percent of the 
voting power regarding distributions of additional income to l;lerself. The court 
also held that Helen's relinquishment of part of her annuity interest within three 
years of her death caused the property to be inclu,dible in her gross estate also lm-
der Section 2035. The court rejected the contention that only the rental value of 
the residence held by the QPRT was includible in Helen's gross estate. The comt 
noted that Section 2036(a) includes the value of the entire m1derlying asset if the 
transferor retains for life (or a term that does not end before death) a right to the 
personal use of that asset. Estate of Disbrow v. Comm 'r, T.C. Memo. 2006-34. 
Helen had the right to live in and actually did live in .the property held by the 
QPRT, and it is includible in her gross estate. 
Note. The comt also held that the estate was entitled to deduct its obliga-
tion under a mortgage on the propmty held by the GRAT, because it established 
that the decedent was personally liable on that debt. The· court denied the deduc-
tion for the remainder interest in the charitable remainder trust created ftoni the 
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QPRT, because the trustees had no authority to create that trust 1.mder the terms of 
the trust instrument. 
D. Code§§ 2056,2044,2519,2523, 2207A. Marital Deduction 
1. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) Unconstitutionally Denies Estate 
Tax Marital Deduction to Otherwise Legally Married Same-Sex Cou-
ple. Windsor v. United States, 570 U.S. _, 2013 WL 3196928, 133 
S.Ct. 2675, 186 L.Ed.2d 808 (S.Ct. Jt.me 27, 2013), ajf'g 699 F.3d 169 (2d 
Cir., 2012), ajj'g 833 F.Supp.2d 394 (S.D. N.Y., 2012) 
Edie met arid established a committed relationship with Thea in 1963, and 
they lived together until Thea's death in 2009. The couple registered as 
domestic partners in New York City, when that became available in 1993. 
They married in Canada in 2007, and New York law recognized the va-
lidity of that mall'iage. Thea's executor (Edie) filed an estate tax return 
claiming the estate tax marital deduction, but the Service denied the de-
duction, based on DOMA. Edie paid the tax and sued for a refmid and· a 
declaration that section 3 of DOMA violates the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that 
the Department of Justice would no longer defend DOMA's constitutional-
ity, because he and the President believed that a heightened standard of 
scrutiny applied to classifications based on sexual orientation, and that 
Section 3 of DOMA failed under this standard. Given the Attorney Gen-
eral's decision not to enforce DOMA, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory 
Gmup of the U.S. House of Representatives ("BLAG") was allowed to in-
tervene in the suit and to defend the constitutionality of the statute. 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
(Judge Jones) granted summary judgment in favor of Windsor, and found 
that the application of DOMA to deny the estate tax marital deduction was 
unconstitutional. The Second Circuit (Chief Judge Jacobs) affirmed, with 
1 judge dissenting in part and concurring in pali. The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiotari. 
A divided U.S. Supreme.Couli affirmed and struck down section 3 
of DOMA, but without addressing the appropriate standard of equal pro- · 
tection review. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, in which Jus-
tices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Chief Justice Rob-
. erts filed a dissent; Justice Scalia filed a dissent iri. which Justice Thomas 
joined and in which Chief Justice Roberts joined in part; and Justice Alito 
wrote a dissent in which Justice Thomas joined in part. The Court first 
held that it had jurisdiction to consider the case, despite the refusal of the 
U.S. Attomey General to defend DOMA. Article 3, Section 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution provides that the Supreme Court cannot issue advisory opin~ 
ions - it may only hear a case or controversy. The Court explained that 
there was clearly a case or controversy in the U.S. District Coul't, because 
a taxpayer·was challenging the collection of a specific tax assessment as 
being unconstitutional. Despite the decision of the Attomey General not 
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·to defend DOMA's definition of maniage, the United States retained a 
sufficient stake in the outcome to support Constitutional jurisdiction on 
appeal. The government had not yet returned to the plaintiff the estate tax 
she had paid, and that refund was "a real and immediate economic injury" 
to the government, whether or not the government decided to defend 
DOMA. Quoting Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 
U.S. 587 (2007). The Court acknowledged that, even when there is a con-
stitutional case or controversy, "prudent concems" conditions judicial re-
view on a finding of "concrete adverseness which sharpens the presenta-
tion of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of 
difficult constitutional questions."· These concerns, however, can be out-
weighed by such co1.mtervailing considerations as the extent to which ad-
versarial presentation of the issues is ensured by the participation of amici 
curiae prepared to defend with vigor the legislative act's constitutionality. 
In this context, BLAG's defense ofDOMA's definition of marriage satis~ 
fied the prudential concems that otherwise might make the Court reluctant 
to hear an appeal from a decision with which the principal parties agree. 
Thus, the Court held that it could properly decide the case. 
The Court then held that DOMA unconstitutionally deprived per-
sons of equal liberty in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The opinion of 
the majori.ty:appears to rely both on the requirement of Federalism- that 
certain actions and subjects are the domain of the states, rather than the 
federal govemment - and equal protection. The Comt noted that the 
states, not the federal government, have historically and traditionally de-
fined and regulated marriage, and that state responsibilities for defining 
and regulating marriage date to the beginning of the country: for "when 
the Constitution was adopted the common understanding was that the do-
mestic relations of husband and wife and parent and child were matters re-
served to the States.'' Quoting Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U. S. 
379, 383-384 (1930). The Comt stressed the special nature of the marital 
relation, stating: 
The States' interest in defining and regulating the 
marital relation, subject to constitutional guarantees, stems 
from the understanding that marriage is more than a routine 
classification for purposes of certain statutory benefits. Pri-
vate, consensual sexual intimacy between two adult persons 
of the same sex may nbt be punished by the State, and it 
can form "but one element in a personal bond that is more 
ep.during." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 123 S.Ct. 
2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003). By its recognition of the va~ 
lidity of same-sex marriages perf01med in other jurisdic-
tions and then by authorizing same-sex unions and same-
sex marriages, New York sought to give further protection 
and dignity to that bond. For same-sex couples who wished 
to be married, the State acted to give their lawful conduct a 
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lawful status. This status is a far-reaching legal acknowl-
edgment of the intimate relationship between two people, a 
relationship deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the 
comn1Unity equal with all other maniages. It reflects both 
the community's considered perspective on the historical 
roots of the institution of maniage and its evolving under-
standing of the meaning of equality. 133 S.Ct. 2675, at 
2692. 
DOMA, the Court stated, rejects the decisions of some states to give a par-
ti_cular class of couples the right to marry. The resulting injury and indig-
nity is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty protected by the 
Fifth Amendment. Th~-Comt stated: 
DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York 
seeks to protect. By doing so it violates basic due process 
and equal' protection principles applicable to the Federal 
Government. See U.S. Const., Amdt. 5; Bolling v. Shmpe, 
347 U.S. 497 (1954). The Constitution's guarantee of 
equality "must at the very least mean that a bare congres-
sional desire to hru.m a politically unpopular group cannot" 
justify disparate treatment of that group. Department of Ag-
riculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-535 (1973). In de-
teqnining whether a law is motived by an improper animus 
or purpose, "[d]iscriminations ,of an unusual character" es-
pecially require careful consideration. Supra, at 19 (quoting 
Romer, supra, at 633). DOMA cannot survive 1.mder these 
principles. 133 S.Ct. 2675, at 2693. 
The Court held that DOMA's principal effect was to identify and make 
unequal a subset of state-sanctioned marriages, and to deprive some cou-
ples married under the laws of their state, but not others, of both rights and 
responsibilities. This would create two contradictory marriage regimes 
within the same state and force same-sex couples to live as married for the 
purpose of state law, but unmanied for the pmpose of federal law. This, 
the comt stated, would reduce the stability and predictability of basic per-
sonal relations the state deemed it appropriate to protect. The Court, ap-
pearing to blend the requirements of equal protection and Federalism, then 
concluded that: 
The class to which DOMA directs its restrictions 
and restraints ru.·e those persons who ru.·e joined in same-sex 
marriages made lawful by the State. DOMA singles out a 
class of persons deemed by a State entitled to recognition 
and protection to enhance their own liberty. It imposes a 
disability on the class by refusing to acknowledge a ·status 
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the State finds to be dignified and proper. DOMA instructs 
all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom 
same-sex couples interact, including their own children, 
that their marriage is less wmthy than the marriages of oth-
ers. The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose 
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure 
those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to pro-
tect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this 
protection and treating those persons as living in marriages 
less respected than others, the federal statute is in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment. This opinion and its holding are 
confmed to those lawful marriages. 133 S.Ct. 2675, at 
2695. 
There were three separate dissenting opinions. Chief Justice Roberts ar-
gued that the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Sec-
ond Circuit,. because there was no case or controversy. On the merits, the 
Chief Justice stated that he believed that Congress acted constitutionally in 
passing DOMA, because of the national interests in uniformity and stabil-
ity in the application of federal laws. He distinguished the issue of same-
sex marriage from other subjects on which state mal.Tiage laws may differ, · 
finding the gender of the parties to be too fundamental to permit state-by-
state variations. Justice Scalia's long dissent contended that the majority 
had overreached and attempted to replace the proper decision of the Con-
gress with its own. Justice Scalia argued that the agreement between the 
plaintiff ruid the government on the proper interpretation of DOMA elimi-
nated any case or controversy and deprived the Court of jurisdiction to 
hear the appeaL He also stated that there were several good reasons for 
DOMA's definition of marriage, including the avoidance of difficult 
choice-of-law issues that are likely to arise in the absence of a unifonn 
federal definition. Justice Alito dissented, stating that the United States 
l(lcked standing to appeal from the holding of the District Court and the 
Second Circuit, because it sought to sustain those holdings, rather than to 
change them. He argued that BLAG was the proper appellant in this case. 
Justice Alito also contended that the Fifth Amendment· cannot defeat 
DOMA under the notion of substantive due process, because that rule pro-
tects only "fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply 
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'" He denied that the right to 
same-sex marriage can fall within that category at this time. 
Note. Windsor means that same-sex manied couples residing in a 
state that recognizes such maniages as valid will clearly be treated as mar-
ried for both state and federal purposes. Recognition of their marriage for 
state law purposes will afford the surviving spouse such benefits as elec-
tive share or augmented estate rights in the first spouse's estate, status as 
an heir at law in the estate of an intestate decedent, whatever priority may 
exist for surviving spouses in the selection of an administrator of a dece-
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dent's estate, and whatever marital deduction or favorable rate may be al-
lowed smviving spouses under applicable state estate or inheritance tax 
laws. Such surviving spouses will now also qualify for the federal estate 
and gift tax marital deductions and portability of a deceased spouse's un-
used basic exclusion amount. 
2. Failure to Divide Marital from Nonmarital Trust Results in Substan-
tial Distributions Being Deemed Made From Noninarital Trust and 
Increases Surviving Spouse's Gross Estate. Estate of Olsen v. Comni '1·, 
T.C. Memo. 2014-58 (April2, 2014) 
Elwood and Grace Olsen created reciprocal revocable trusts· as part of 
their estate plan. Elwood was named trustee of both trusts. Grace died 
first, and her instmments required that her assets be divided into a non-
marital tru$t and two marital trusts. Elwood, however, failed to divide the 
trust. The tenus of the nonmarital trust provided for distributions of in-
come and principal to the couple's children and grandchildren, and distri-
butions to charitable organizations. Principal and income of the nomnari-
tal trust could be used for the Elwood, if the marital trust principal had 
been exhausted. After Grace's death, Elwood donated from Grace's trust a 
total of $1.08 million to Momingside College, where he and Grace had 
gone to school and where he had been employed. Elwood also withdrew 
$393,978 from Grace's trust and deposited it into one of his own accounts.· 
In examining Elwood's estate, the IRS contended that all of these transfers 
should be charged against the nonmm·ital trust, and that the remaining as-
sets should all be deemed part of the marital trust and includible in El-
wood's gross estate under Section 2044. 
The Tax Court (Judge Chiechi) held that $607,928 (the value that 
was to have been transferred to the marital trusts, less the withdrawals that 
Elwood deposited into his oyvn account)must be included in Elwood's 
gross estate as assets of the marital tmsts. The court noted that the marital 
trusts did not permit distributions to charity, so that it must conclude that 
the was made from the nonmarital trust, which allowed such distributions. 
The estate argued that the withdrawals should be treated as having come 
from the marital trusts because the instrument expressed the grantor's in-
tent to minimize estate taxes for the benefit of the remainder beneficiaries. 
Had the withdrawals come from the marital trusts, they would have been 
effectively eliminated by the surviving spouse's death, reducing total es-
tate taxes. The court, however, found equally persuasive the couple's long 
history of philanthropy and the express authority in the nonmarital trust to 
make charitable distributions. 
Note. It is unusual for a nonmarital trust to authorize charitable 
distributions, because they would constitute deductible distributions made 
from a nontaxable fund. It would be much better tax planning for the mar-
ital tmst to authorize and then make distributions of principal to the sur-
viving spouse, and then for the surviving spouse make the charitable gifts 
personally .. This produces· additional charitable income tax deductions for 
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the surviving spouse, and takes full advantage of the gift tax charitable de-
duction, too: 
3. Sale of Assets Distributed from QTIP for Defened Private Annuity 
Results in Taxation Under Section 2519. Estate of Kite v. Comm'r, T.C. 
No. 6772-08,2013 TNT 208-18 (Ul)pub'd Op., Oct. 25, 2013) 
Virginia Kite (the decedent) was the cun·ent income beneficiary of numer-
ous trusts, including two QTIPs, a general power of appointment marital 
trust, and a revocable trust. QTIP-1 had been created by the decedent for 
the lifetime benefit of her husband, James, who died a week later, creating 
a QTIP trust for the decedent. QTIP-2 vvas a reverse QTIP trust created at 
James' death. The power of appointment marital trust was created at 
James' death. In 1996, the trusts created a limited partnership, a majority 
of the shares of the corporate general partner (Easterly) of which were 
owned by Virginia, through her revocable trust, and the balance by her 
children, directly and through various trusts. · In 1998, the limited partner-
ship was moved to Texas and became the Baldwin Limited Partnership. 
In May 1998, Virginia, through her trusts, sold her remaining interest in 
the partnership to her children, either individually or to their trusts, for 
$12.5 milliqn in of secured, fully recourse promissory notes (the Baldwin 
notes). On December 31, 2000, Virginia's trusts contributed the Baldwin 
notes and Easterly contributed 1 percent of its value to form Kite Family 
Investment Co. (KIC), a Texas general partnership. In 2001 the QTIP 
trusts and the marital deduction trust were liquidated, and the trusts' as-
sets, which consisted entirely of family partnership interests, were trans-
ferr-ed to Virginia's revocable trust. The family partnership interests held 
by the revocable trust were then transferred to the decedent's children in 
exchange for 1 0-year deferred private annuity agreements. 
The Tax. Court (Judge Paris) held that, under the step-transaction 
doctrine, Virginia was deemed to have made a taxable disposition of the 
qualifying income interest. Therefore, the sale was taxable as a gift of the 
remainder interest in the property sold for a private annuity. The court 
recognize~ that the proportionate share of the annuity value that was 
traceable to the QTIP trusts was not readily apparent, and it asked the par-
ties to calculate the amount of the gift. The parties submitted their pro-
posed valuations, and not surprisingly, they disagreed rather strongly on 
the amount of the deemed taxable gift. The Tax Court, in an unpublished 
opinion, sustained the IRS calculation of the amount of the taxable gift. 
The court noted that Section2519(a) states that any disposition of all or 
part of a qualifying income interest for life is treated as a transfer of all in~ 
terests in the property other than the qualifying income interest, and the 
regulations add that the spouse is treated as making a gift of the remainder 
interest under Section 2519 and of the income interest under Section 2511. 
Regs. § 25.2519~1(a). The amount of the remainder interest gift is "the fair 
market value of the entire property subject to the qualifying income inter-
est, determined on the date of the disposition * * *, less the value of the 
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qualifying income interest in the prope1ty on the date of the disposition." 
The parties agreed that the fair mai:ket value of the QTIP trust assets was 
$2,665,106 and on the disposition date the value of the annuity traceable 
to remainder interest in the QTIP trusts was$1,484,011. The taxpayer, 
however, argued that no gift tax was due, because the court had held that 
the annuity transaction was a bona fide sale for adequate and full consid-
eration. Therefore, the taxpayer argued, Mrs .. Kite had transfened an in-
come interest worth $1,181,095 for an annuity worth $1,181,095, and she 
had transferred a remainder interest worth $1;484,011 for an mmuity worth 
$1,484,011. The court explained, however, that this is not how Section 
2519 operates. The court agreed with the IRS that the Kite annuity trans-
action was an intermediary step between tenninating the QTIP trusts and 
selling the QTIP trust assets to the Kite children, in an attempt to circum-
vent the QTIP regime and avoid any deemed transfer under Section 2519. 
A deemed transfer of a remainder interest under section 2519 cannot be 
reduced merely because consideration is received for the transfer of the 
income interest. The donee spouse cannot receive consideration in ex-
change for a remainder interest that the done could not actually transfer. 
The court also stated that this result was supported by the intent of the 
marital deduction and the QTIP regime, that property passes untaxed from 
a predeceasing spouse to a surviving spouse but'is then included in the es~ 
tate of the surviving spouse. Estate of Letts v. Comm.'r, 109 T.C. 290, 295 
(1997), affd without pub 'd op., 212 F.3d 600 (11th Cir. 2000). The QTIP 
provisions allow QTIP to pass to a surviving spouse tax free at the first 
spouse's death, but they require thaf the QTIP be subject to transfer taxes 
at the earlier of (1) the date on which the surviving spouse disposes (by 
gift, sale, or otherwise) of all or part of the qualifying income interest, or 
(2) upon the surviving spouse's death. See H.R. Rept. No. 97-201, 97th 
Cong., 2d Sess. at·161 (1981 
Note. The application of Section 2519 should not be that much of 
a concern to practitioners. First, the previously-QTIP assets were sold for 
a defened annuity, with no payments to be made for the flrst 10 years. 
There was, therefore, no income inferest after the sale. 
Second, Virginia removed the corporate trustee and put her chil-
dren in as trustees of the QTIP; it was unclear whether the children even 
had authority under the instrument to terminate the QTIP trust a11d distrib-
ute all of its assets to the decedent, as they did. 
Third, the step-transaction argument was pretty easy to sustain, be-
cause the children terminated the QTIP and distributed its assets to Virgin-
ia on the smne day fhat they were substituted as trustees. The next day, 
the family consolidated assets of several partnerships in one extant fmnily 
partnership. The day after that, Virginia sold her pmtnership interests for 
the defened private annuity. 
Fomth, the court approved the fact that the QTIP created a fmnily 
partnership and conve1ted its assets to partnership interests. The court 
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stated that this was just a change in the form of the investments, and did 
not impair Virginia's qualifying income interests for life. 
So, what does this tell. us. Probably just that if, in a clearly inte-
grated transaction, you withdraw principal from a QTIP and transfer the 
underlying assets without retaining an income interest, you risk ta'Cation 
under Section 2519. I am not sure how much of a surprise that ought to 
be. 
See also discussion of gift tax consequences of the private annuity 
sales under Section 2511. 
4. IRS Applies a Law-of-the-Ceremony Rule to Same-Sex Marriages. 
Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201 (Sept. 16, 2013) 
The IRS responded to the Supreme Court's.opinion in Windsor, ruling that 
same-sex couples who are legally married in states or foreign countries 
that recognize the validity of their man·iages will be treated as married for 
all federal ·tax purposes, even if they live in a state or other Jurisdiction 
that does not recognize same-sex maniages. The IRS noted that it had 
long interpreted such as "husband," "wife," ''spouse," and "married" for 
income tax purposes in this maimer. In Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60, 
the IRS had stated that individuals who entered into a common-law mar-
riage in a state that recognizes common-law marriages should be recog-
nized as married for federal income tax purposes, regardless of the law of 
the jurisdiction in which the individuals are currently domiciled. The IRS 
explained that: 
The Service has applied this rule with respect to common- · 
law marriages for over 50 years, despite the refusal of some 
states to give full faith and credit to common-law marriages 
established in other states. Although states have different 
rules of marriage recognition, uniform nationwide rules are 
essential for efficient and fair tax administration. A nlle 
. under which a couple's marital status could change simply 
by moving fi·om one state to another state would be pro-
hibitively difficult and costly for the Service to administer, 
and for many taxpayers to apply. 
This ruling is relatively old, but it has been cited by the IRS as recently as 
this year. See, e.g., PLRs 201310047 ("In the administration of federal in-
come tax laws, the marital status of individuals is determined under state 
law pursuant to Rev. Rul. 58-66"), 200524006, 200524007, 200339001, 
9850011. 
The IRS explained further that, after Windsor, gender-neutral te1ms 
in the Code that refer to marital status, such as "spouse" and "marriage," 
inust include both individuals married to a person of the same sex if the 
couple is lawfully married under state law, and such a maniage between 
individuals of the same sex. The IRS explained that this reading was the 
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most natural, that is was consistent with Windsor, which involved a Code 
reference to·"spouse," that "a narrower interpretation would not further the 
pmposes of y:fficient tax administration," and that tlris interpretation 
"avoids the serious constitutional questions that an altemate reading would 
create, and is permitted by the text and purposes of the Code." The IRS 
stated that Windsor recognized tl1at it had an effect beyond the yState tax 
marital deduction, noting that the Court had stated that: 
[t]he pruticular case at hand concerns the estate tax, but 
DOMA is more than simply a determination of what should 
or should not be allowed as an estate ta.'{ refund. Among the 
over 1,000 statutes and numerous Federal regulations that 
DOMA controls are laws peliaining to ... taxes. 
Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, at 2694 (S.Ct., 2013). The IRS also stated that 
an interpretation of the gender-specific tenns in the Code to exclude same-
sex spouses should be avoided because it would raise "serious constitu-
tional questions under the Fifth Amendment analysis in Windsor "[b ]y 
creating two contradictory marriage regimes within the same State, DO-
MA forces same-sex couples to live as mamed for the purpose of state law 
but unmarried for the purpose of Federal law, thus diminishing the stabil-
ity and predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it 
proper to acknowledge and protect." Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, at 2694 
(S.Ct., 2013). The IRS also stated that the Code permits a gender-neutral 
·construction of the gender-specific terms, noting that, among other things 
Section 770l(p), by its cross-reference to the Dictionary Act, provides that 
"words importing the masculine gender include the feminine as well," and 
that the 1871 legislative history of this statute explained that it was de-
signed to avoid having to "specify males and females by using a great deal 
of mmecessary lru1guage when one word would express the whole." 1 
U.S.C. § 1; Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 777 (1871) (statement of 
Sen. Trumbull, sponsor of Dictionary Act). One court has, the IRS noted, 
read this as requiring construction of the phrase "husband and wife" to in-
clude same-sex married couples. See Pedersen v. Office of Personnel 
Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 306-07 (D. Conn. 2012). The IRS also ex-
plained that a "gender-neutral reading of the Code fosters fairness by en-
suring that the Service treats same-sex couples in the same manner as sitn-
ilarly situated opposite-sex couples" and also "fosters administrative effi-
ciency because the Service does not collect or maintain information on the 
gender of ~axpayers and would have great difficulty admitristering a 
scheme that differentiated between same-sex and opposite-sex married 
couples." 
The IRS stated that, therefore, the tern1s "husband and wife," "hus-
band,'' and "wife" include an individual mruried to a person of the same 
sex if they were lawfully mruried in a state whose laws authorize the mar-
riage of two individuals of the same sex, and the tenn "mru-riage" includes 
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such marriages of individuals of the same sex. Individuals of the same sex 
will be considered to be lawfully married for federal tax purposes as long 
as they were married in a state whose laws authorize the marriage of two 
individuals of the same sex, even if they are domiciled in a state that does 
not recognize the validity of same-sex marriages. The IRS explained that 
"our increasingly mobile society" makes it important to have rule that can 
be applied with certainty, and that a state-of-domicile rule "would present 
serious administrative concerns" and would raise challenges for employers 
who operate in multiple states or who have employees or fanner employ-
ees residing in different states. 
A rule of recognition based on the state of a taxpayer's current 
domicile would also raise significant challenges for employers that operate 
in more than one state, or that have employees (or fom1er employees) who 
live in more than one state, or move between states with different marriage 
recognition rules. Substantial financial and administrative burdens would 
be placed on those employers, as well as the administrators of employee 
benefit plans. 
The IRS added, however, that for Federal tax purposes, the term 
11marriage 11 does not include registered domestic partnerships, civil unions, 
or other similar formal relationships recognized under state law that are 
not denominated as a marriage under that state's law. The use in federal 
tax law of such terms as "spouse," "husband and wife," 11husband," and 
"wife" will not include individuals who have entered itito such a formal re-
lationship, whether the individuals have entered into such relationships are 
of the opposite sex or the same sex. 
The IRS stated that this ruling will be applied prospectively as of 
September 16,2013. For tax year 2013 and going forward, taxpayers gen-
erally must ftle returns reflecting marital status as detemrined under Rev. 
Rul. 2013-17. Therefore, married same-sex couples would file income tax 
returns either as married filing separately or jointly filing status, and they 
would be able to file gift tax returns gift-splitting and claiming the gift tax 
marital deduction. For tax year 2012 and all prior years, same-sex spouses 
who file an original tax return on or after September 16, 2013 also must 
generally file using a married filing separately or jointly filing status. 
Same-sex spouses who filed their 2012 income or gift tax returns before 
September 16, 2013, may, if they wish, amend their returns to file reflect-
ing their marital status as dete1mined under Rev. Rul. 2013-17. For tax 
years 2011 and earlier, same-sex spouses who filed their tax returns on 
tinle may, but are not required to, amend their federal tax returns to file re-
flecting marital status determined under Rev. Rul. 2013-17, if the statute 
of limitations for amending the retum has not expired. 
Note. Same-sex married couples will now be treated as married for 
federal income, gift, estate, and GST tax purposes. Same-sex spouses will 
now be afforded such advantages as gift splitting, the federal estate and 
gift tax marital deductions, the ability to make a reverse QTIP election for 
GST tax purposes, the ability to treat a spouse who is significantly young-
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er than the transferor as being ·assigned to the same generation for GST tax 
purposes, and the ability of the surviving spouse to obtain portability of a 
deceased spouse's unused basic exclusion amount. San\e-sex spouses will 
also, however, lose the ability to file two independent income tax returns, 
and will have to file federal income tax retums either as manied filing 
jointly or married filing separately. 
Rev. Rul. 2013-17 may also affect the state tax treatment of some 
same-sex couples. Windwr did not require that states recognize tlw validi-
ty of same-sex marriages, and many states, such as Virginia and Ohio, 
have statutes and Constitutional provisions that expressly reject the validi-
ty of same-sex marriages. Some of these states also require that the same· 
filing status be used for federal and state income tax retmns. See, howev-
er, Va. Code § 58.1-341 (requiring a husband and wife who file a joint 
federal retum to file a joint Virginia retum, and requiring a husband and 
wife who file separate federal returns to file separate Virginia retums). It 
is unclear how a state department of taxation will resolve the conflict be-
tween such anti -same-sex malTiage provisions and state laws that require 
taxpayers to use the same filing status for federal and state tax rettm1s. In 
states in which the state constitutio~1 prohibits recognition of same-sex 
maniages, it seems likely that the statutes requiring confonnity in filing 
status would be subordinated to the state constitutional provisions. In 
states in which both issues are addressed only statutorily, the results are 
unceliain and m1predictable. 
There is also a question about the constitutional considerations 
where a same-sex couples who is married in state A that permits such mar-
riages then becomes domiciled in state B, that does not recognize such sex 
marriages. Aliicle IV, section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states, in part, 
that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." A marriage en-
tered into in one state would fall under the "public Acts" provision of the 
full faith and credit clause. Generally, the coulis have held that full faith 
and credit afforded public acts differs from that afforded judgments. Pub-
lic acts of one state may be disregarded by a forum state if they violate a 
strong public policy of the forum state. See Baker by Thomas v. General 
Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998); Gaillard v. Field, 381 F.2d 25 (lOth 
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 
Inc., 442 F.Supp. 1010 (D.R.I. 1977), affd, 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir., 
1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 916 (1979). Generally, the Full Faith and 
Credit clause does not appear to require one state to give effect to same-
sex marriages performed in another state. A forum state may choose to do 
so, but it is not required to do so, paliicularly if doing so would violate a 
strong public policy of the forum state. 
It is interesting that Windsor struck down only section 3 of DO~ 
MA. Section 2 of DOMA, which was not discussed by the Couli, pro-
vides that: 
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No State, tenitory, or possession of the United States, or 
Indian tribe, shall be required to .give effect to any public 
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, terri-
tory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between 
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under 
the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, 
qr a right or claim arising from such relationship. 28 
U.S.C. § 1738C. 
This statement appears to be authorized by the second sentence of Article 
IV, section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which states "And the Congress 
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, 
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." It is unclear 
whether Section 2 ofDOMA adds anything of significance. Each state al-
. ready appears to have the authority under the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
to ignore public acts of another state, ifthey violate a strong public policy 
of the forum state. Furthennore, Section 2 of DOMA does not require that 
· states refuse to recognize same~sex marriages obtained in another state- it 
merely authorizes them to do so. Thus, the retention of Section 2 of DO- · 
MA appears to have little consequence. 
In Tax Bull. 13~13 (Nov. 8, 2013), the Va. Dept. of Tax'n stated 
that, because same~sex married couples are not married under Virginia 
law, and despite Rev. Rul. 2013-17, must file as unmarried persons for 
Virginia income tax purposes, even if they file as married persons for feel~ 
eral purposes. They must create a pro forma federal income tax return us-
ing either single or head-of-household status, as the case may be, in order 
to determine their Virginia taxable income. See also similar declaration 
from the Utah Tax Commission (Oct. 15, 2013), http://incometax. 
utah.gov/:filing/filing-status, which also noted that the taxpayers should not 
file the "as-if" federal return either with the federal govermnent or the 
Utah Tax Commission, but rather keep it as part of their tax records, in 
· case of an audit. 
5. Marital Deduction Not Allowed for Portion of Elective Share That 
Cannot ·Actually Be Transferred to Surviving Spouse. C.C.M. 
201416007 (April18, 2014) 
D, a U.S. person, made a gift to an irrevocable trust in Country A for the 
benefit ofD and D's adult child, Child. The trust is not subject to the ju-
risdiction of the U.S. courts. D died, survived by Spouse, who asse1ted 
her right tinder applicable state law to an elective share of D's estate. 
Under state law, Spouse· was entitled to a fractional share of D's augment-
ed estate, which included the gifts made to the trust for D and Child. The 
augmented estate would be satisfied first by D's probate assets and the as-
sets of D's revocable trust, and if that is inadequate, with the gifts made by 
D that are inciudible in the augmented estate. The probate and revocable 
trust assets were insufficient, and Spouse became entitled to part of the 
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gift made by D to the trust: D's executors deducted the elective share as 
marital deduction property on D's estate tax return. 
The IRS Chief Counsel stated that, to the extent that the elective 
share was satisfied with property given to a trust for D and Child, it could 
not qualify for the estate tax marital deduction, because it did not pass 
from D to Spouse. The IRS noted that, under the law of Country A, state 
laws governing spousal inheritance have no effect on the continuation of 
the trqst and the comts of Country A will not recognize the rights of 
Spouse against the assets. of the trust. State law detennines the property 
rights passing to Spouse in the prope1iy, though federal estate tax law de-
termines the taxation of those property rights. Comm 'r v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 
456 (1967); Heim v. Comm'r,_ 914 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1990). In this case, 
the pecuniary amount of the elective share passing to Spouse was deter-
mined under state law by taldng into account the value of the trust assets, 
but those assets are not actually available to satisfy that elective share, be.-
cause they are held subject to the laws of Country A and those laws will 
not permit distribution of the trust assets to Spouse. Normally, an elective 
share is treated as passing from the decedent to the surviving spouse for 
marital deduction purposes. See Code § 2056(c)(3) and Reg. § . 
20.2056(c)-1(a)(3). Any property interest transferred during life is con-
, sidered as having passed to the person to whom the decedent transferred 
the interest, however. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-1(a)(5). Propetiy that passes 
from a decedent in trust is considered to have passed from the decedent to 
the surviving spouse only to the extent of the surviving spouse's beneficial 
interest in the. trust. Citing Estate of Turner v. Comm 'r, 138 T.C. 306 
(2012) ("[a] propetiy interest is considered as passing to the smviving 
spouse only if it passes to the spouse as beneficial owner" (emphasis add-
ed)). In the facts in this ruling, because Spouse received none of the bene-
ficial ownership of the trust assets, they are not deemed to have passed to 
Spouse for purposes of the marital deduction, and they are not deductible. 
Note. Practitioners are sometimes asked how to avoid the rights of 
a surviving spouse under an augmented estate statute modeled after the 
Uniform Probate Code. This has always been a difficult issue to resolve, 
but this memorandum suggests that creating a foreign situs asset protec-
tion trust to· hold a substantial portion of a client's assets may succeed in 
frustrating the elective share rights of a surviving spouse. It is a pretty 
dramatic step to take, but at least the practitioner now has one suggestion 
that he or she can make. 
6. Transfers Under premarital Agreement Qualify for Marital Deduc-
tion. PLR 20140011 (March 7, 2014) 
Taxpayer and Spouse executed premarital agreement under which each 
waived their respective right of election to take against the other's will. 
The agreement provides that upon Taxpayer's death, if Spouse survives 
him and if they are then married and living together, Spouse will receive 
an outright payment of $w, free and net of any and all estate, transfer and 
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income taxes, or, if Taxpayer and Spouse were married and living together 
for at least 1 0 years when he dies, Spouse will receive a QTIP marital bust 
with at least ~ percent of Taxpayer's taxable estate, before deducting 
amounts due for Federal estate tax purposes under the premarital agree-
ment. Taxpayer established a revocable trust to carry out the provisions of 
the premarital agreement, providing that if Spouse makes a timely election 
to waive elective share, the trustee will allocate and make distributions to 
Spouse as provided in the premarital agreement. The trust provides that 
the trustee can satisfy the payments under the premarital agreement with 
preferred non-voting units of LLC. Taxpayer, as u·ustee of the revocable 
trust, holds voting and non-voting common. units of LLC and all of the 
preferred units. 
The IRS stated that Spouse's right to elect under the premarital 
agreement and the revocable trust is not a "contingency" that would dis-
qualify the transfers .for the estate tax marital deduction, under Section 
2056(b)(1). The revocable trust property actually distributed outright to 
Spouse and to marital trust will be property "passing from the decedent to 
his surviving spouse" for marital deduction purposes. The IRS discussed 
several precedents. In Rev. RuL 54-446, 1954-2 C.B. 303, a couple signed 
a premarital agreement under which each spouse renounced rights in the 
other's estate. The husband died, and his will left the wife more than was 
required by the premarital agreement, and specified that the dispositions 
were in lieu of any rights she might have under the premarital agreement. 
The IRS ruled that the amount left to the wife under the will "passed from 
the decedent to his smviving spouse" and qualified for the estate tax mari-
tal deduction. In Rev. Rul. 6~-271, 1968-1 C.B. 409, a wife renounced her 
marital rights by signing a premarital agreement, in retum for a promise of 
a stated SUlll from husband's estate, if she survived him. The husband 
died and his will made no provision for the wife. The wife put in a claim 
against the husband's estate and the estate paid the required sum to the 
wife. The ruling stated that the interest passing to the wife pursuant to the 
premarital agreement "passed from the decedent to his smviving spouse" 
and qualified for the estate .tax marital deduction. In Estate of Tompkins v. 
Comm 'r, 68 T.C. 912 (1977), acq., 1982-1 C.B. 1, a decedent gave his 
widow a life estate in trust, and by codicil provided that she could elect to 
take an outright cash bequest in lieu of the life estate. To elect the cash 
bequest, the. widow had to file an election with the executor within 60 days 
after his qualification. The widow elected the cash bequest and the court 
held that the procedural requirement did not prevent the disposition from 
qualifying for the estate tax marital deduction, and that the cash bequest 
was a nontenninable interest. In Rev. Rul. 82-184, 1982-2 C.B. 215, the 
IRS considered a situation similar to that in Tompkins and reached the 
same conclusion. In the mling, the IRS stated that the 180-day require-
ment for Spouse to claim the interests promised by the premarital agree-
ment did not interfere with the estate ta.~ marital deduction, and that the 
QTIP interest would be deductible. The IRS also noted that the terms of 
24 
the QTIP trust directed the trustee to distribute all net income at least quar-
ter-annually, and that the fact the bequest was satisfied by LLC preferred 
units did not prevent allowance of the marital deduction. The IRS noted 
that the sale of LLC prefetTed units was not unreasonably restricted by the 
LLC agreement, which allowed a member to transfer units to (a) another 
member, (b) a qualified institutional transferee, (c) the husband, his chil-
dren, and/or any affiliate, without obtaining the prior written consent of a 
majority in interest of the members. 
7. The "Huh?" Award for 2013: IRS Agrees to Ignore QTIP Election 
Made on Credit Shelter Trust That Could Not Be a QTIP Anyway. 
PLR 201338003 (Sept. 20, 2013) 
Decedent's will left all of his tangible property outright to Spouse and left 
the residue of his estate to his 'revocable trust. The revocable tmst pro-
vided for division of the fund into Trust 1 (a marital trust) and Trust 2 (a 
credit shelter nonmarital trust). The amount to ftmd Trust 2 is that 
amount that vvill pass free of federal and state death taxes. The trustee of 
Trust 2 has discretion to pay so much of the n,et income and principal as is 
necessary for the health, education, support and maintenance of Spouse 
and Decedent's children. Undistributed income will be accumulated and 
added to principal. Upon Spouse's death, Tmst 2 will continue for the 
benefit of Son, until Son reaches age 35, when the trust corpus will be dis-
tributed to Son. Spouse, the executrix of Decedent's estate, allocated all 
of the assets of Trust to Trust 2 and did not establish Trust 1. Spouse filed 
a timely estate tax retum and listed Trust 2 under QTIP property. With the 
·assistance of new counsel, Spouse discovered that the QTIP election for 
Trust 2 was not necessary to reduce Decedent's estate tax liability to zero. 
The IRS stated that it would ignore the QTIP election made with 
respect to Trust 2. The IRS cited Rev. Proc. 2001-38, 2001-1 C.B. 1335, 
in which the Service stated that it would treat a QTIP election as null and 
void for purposes of Sections 2044(a), 2056(b)(7), 2519(a), and 2652, 
where the election was not necessary to reduce the estate tax liability to 
zero, based on values as finally detennined for federal estate tax purposes. · 
The IRS stated that it would ignore the QTIP election in this case because 
it was not required to reduce the decedent's estate tax to zero, and that 
Spouse would not be deemed to by the transferor of Trust 2 for GST tax 
purposes, absent a "reverse QTIP" election under Section 2652(a)(3). 
Furthermore, the property held in Trust 2 will not be includible in 
Spouse's gross estate under Section 2044, and Spouse will not be treated 
as making a. gift under Section 2519 if Spouse disposes of the income in-
terest with respect to the property. 
Note. It is hard to fathom why the IRS gave this mling, because 
Trust 2 fails to meet any of the requirements of a valid QTIP. It does not 
require that all income be paid cutTently to Spouse, and it permits distribu-
tions to persons other than Spouse during Spouse's lifetime. The IRS 
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III. GIFT T~"XES 
should simply have ruled that there was no valid QTIP election as to Trust 
2 in the first place. 
A. Code § 2503. Gift Tax Annual Exclusion 
Annual Exclusion Adjusted for Inflation. Rev. Proc. 2013-35, § 3.34, 2013-47 
I.R.B. 537 (Nov. 18, 2013) 
The gift tax annual exclusion rises to $14,000 for transfers made in 2014. The 
annual exclusion for gifts to a non-U.S. citizen spouse is raised to $145,000 for 
gifts made in2014. · 
B. Code § 2512. Val{!ation of Gifts 
1. Tax Court Denies Summary Judgment toiRS on Net, Net Gift. Stein-
berg v. Comm'r, 141 T.C. _(No.8) (Sept. 30, 2013) 
When she was 89, Jean Steinberg entered into a binding agreement with 
her four daughters under which Jean would make gifts of cash and securi-
ties to her daughters in exchange for the daughtersr agreement to assume 
and pay any federal gift tax liability collllected with the gifts, including 
any federal' or state estate tax liability imposed under Section 203 5 (b) if 
Jean died within three years of the gifts. (Section 2035(b) includes in a 
decedenfs gross estate the gift taxes paid on any gift made by the decedent 
within three years of death.) The net gift agreement was the result of sev-
eral months of negotiation between Jean and her daughters, and they each 
were represented by separate cOlmsel. An independent professional ap-
praiser calculated the aggregate fair market value of the net gift, taking in-
to account the agreement to pay the gift and potential estate taxes. The 
appraiser valued the net gift by reducing the fair market value of the cash 
and securities by both (1) the gift tax paid by the donees, and (2) the actu-
arial value of the donees' assumption of potential Section 203 5 (b) estate 
tax. The appraiser determined the actuarial value of the donees' assump-
tion of the potential Section 2035(b) estate tax by calculating Jean's annu-
al mortality rate for the three years after the gift (the probability that she 
would die within one~ two, or three years of the gift), among other things. 
The appraiser stated that the value of the net gift was $71.6 million, re-
flecting, among other things, a $5.8 million value for the assumed Section 
2035(b) estate tax liability. Jean filed a timely gift tax return and paid $32 
million of gift tax. 
The IRS issued a notice of deficiency, increasing the value of the 
net gift to $75.6 million and the amount of the tax to $33.8 million, be-
cause it disallowed the valuation adjustment for the assumption of the Sec-
tion 2035(b) estate tax liability. The IRS conceded that Jean had accurate-
ly stated the value of the cash and securities given, that the net gift agree-
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ment was legally enforceable, and that Jean had properly reduced the 
amount of the gift by the gift· taxes that the donees assumed. The IRS 
moved for stmunary judgment in Tax Court, however, arguing that the as-
sumption of potential Section 2035(b) estate tax liability could never con-
stitute consideration in money or money's worth under Section 2512(b ), 
and thus could not reduce the amount of Jean's taxable gift. The IRS re-
lied largely on the Tax Com·t's earlier decision in McCord v. Comm 'r, 120 
T.C. 358 (2003), rev'd and rem 'd sub nom. Succession of McCord v. 
Comm'r, 461 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 2006). 
The Tax Comi (Judge Kenigan for the majority), rejected the 
summary judgment and stated that, while tllis case was not appealable to 
the Fifth Circuit and it was by Succession of McCord, the Fifth Circuit's 
reasoning was persuasive and the Tax Court would no longer follow its 
own 2003 opinion in McCord. The majority, adopting the Fifth Circuit's 
reasoning, stated that the value of the assun1ption of the estate tax liabil-
ity was not "too speculative," and that a willing buyer and a willing sell-
er would, in appropriate circtm1stances, take into account the assumption 
of potential estate tax liability in arriving at a sale price. See Regs. § 
25.2512-1 (the value of a gift is the price at which the transferred prop-
erty would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, 
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and .both having 
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts). The comi stated that, whether 
Jean would Sut'Vive three years after making the gift was a simple con-
tingency based on the possibility of survivorship. The court rejected the 
IRS's assessment that the assumption of potential estate tax liability 
failed under the estate depletion theory. To qualify as consideration in 
money or money's worth, the consideration received mi1st be reducible 
to value in money or money's worth; consideration consisting of some-
thing unquantifiable, such as love and affection or the promise of mar-
riage, is wholly disregarded. Regs. § 25.2512-8. Under the estate deple-
tion theory, a donor receives consideration in money or money's worth 
only to the extent that the donor's estate has been replenished. The IRS 
argued that the donees' assumption of potential Section 2035(b) estate 
tax liability would not benefit the estate, but the comi stated that it could 
provide a tangible benefit to the donor's estate. The maj01ity stated that 
the Tax Court's earlier distinction between a benefit to the donor's estate 
and a benefit to the donor was incorrect, and that for purposes of the es-
tate depletion theory, the donor and the donor's estate were "inextricably 
bound" and the donees' assumption of potential estate tax liability could 
provide a tangible benefit to tl1e donor's estate. Judges Colvin, Foley, 
Vasquez, Wherry, Holmes, Paris, and Buch joined in the majority opin-
lOn. 
Judges Gale, Goeke, Kroupa, Gustafson, MolTison and Lauber 
conculTed in the result only. Judge Lauber wrote a concurring opinion, 
agreeing with the court's conclusion that the IRS's motion should be de~ 
nied~ but disagreed that it was appropriate for the comi to overrule 
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McCord at this stage of the litigation. Judge Lauber stated that a "foresee-
able valuation issue . . . :may result from the strategy in this case at the 
time of a donor's death." The valuation of the obligation would, he con-
tended, require consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case, 
including: (1) whether Jean's daughters, at the time of the gifts, were ben-
eficiaries under her will; (2) whether Jean's daughters, if not then benefi-
ciaries under her will, should be regarded as such because they were the 
natural objects of her affection and bounty; (3) whether Jean, a New York 
resident when she made the gifts, should be deemed aNew York domicili-
ary for purposes of applying the New York apportionment statute; (4) 
whether the net gift agreement provides an effective enforcement mecha-
nism that does not exist under applicable New York law; (5) whether the 
bulk of Jean's assets will be subject to probate or will pass by trust or oth-
er nonprobate mechanism, which might affect ease of enforcement; and 
( 6) whether any incremental enforcement benefit is substantial enough to 
constitute "consideration" under Section 2512(b). Judges Gale, Goeke, 
Kroupa, Gustafson, and Monison agreed with this opinion. 
Judge Goeke added that it was not logical to presume that the value 
of an obligation to pay poten~ial Section 2035(b) liability is the same when 
the obligation is made as at the time of the donee's death. Judge Goeke 
stated that the effect of the donor's estate tax apportionment clause would 
be relevant to determining the value of the donees' obligation. 
Judge Halpem wrote a dissenting opinion, stating that he would 
grant the IRS's motion because allowing a reduction of an otherwise taxa-
ble transfer by an actuarial estimate of the value of the estate tax that 
might result because of the application of Section 2035(b) was incon-
sistent with the purpose of Section 203 5(b ). 
Note. The Steinberg litigation will continue, but this opinion is a 
very hopeful sign that net gifts will be more useful where the donees enter 
into a binding agreement to be responsible for both the gift tax and any es-
tate tax attributable to inclusion of the gift tax in the donor's gross estate 
under Section 2035(b). Such an additional assumption may, as demon-
strated in this decision, meaningfully reduce the value of the transfer for 
gift tax purposes, even if the donor ultimately survives for more than three 
years. 
2. Self-Cancelling Installment Note Not Valued Under Section 7520; 
Premium Based on Seller's Actual Health. CCA 201330033 (July 26, 
2013) 
D .established several separate grantor for the benefit of his family 
members. D funded the tmsts With common voting and prefened non-
voting stock of Y corporation. Thereafter, D sold Y corporation stock 
to the tmsts in exchange for interest-bearing self-canceling installment 
notes. The notes required that the tmst make only annual interest pay-
ments during the term of the note and further required that the principal 
be paid on the final date of the term. The appraised value of the stock 
28 
that D transfened to the. trusts was $x, and the total face value of the 
self-cancelling notes was almost double the value of the stock sold, re-
flecting the premium for self-cancelation. The premium was calculated 
using the actuarial tables under Section 7520. In some notes, the princi-
pal was increased to reflect the SCIN premium, and in other notes, the 
interest rate was increased. D died less than six months after the trans-
fer, and therefore, received neither the interest payments nor the princi~ 
pal due on the notes. 
The Chief Counsel advised that: (1) if the fair market value of the 
notes is less than the fair mm;ket value of the property transfen-ed to the 
grantor trusts, the difference in value is a deemed gift; (2) the notes 
should be valued based on a method that takes into account the willing-
buyer willing seller standard and should also accotmt for D's medical 
history on the date ofthe gift; and (3) there is no estate tax consequence 
associated vyith the cancellation of the notes with the self-cancelling fea-
ture upon D's death. The IRS explained that, where propetiy is ex-
changed for promissory notes, there is no gift if the value of the property 
transferred is substantially equal to the value of the notes. The face value 
and length of payments of the riotes must be reasonable in light of the 
.circumstances. To determine whether there is a gift, the IRS determines 
the value of the transfen-ed stock and the value of the notes, taking into 
consideration the self-cancelling feature. If the fair market value of the 
notes is less than the fair market value of the property transfen-ed to the 
grantor trusts, the ·difference in value is deemed a gift. The IRS dis-
cussed Estate of Costanza v.Comm'r, 320 F. 3d 595 (6th Cir. 2003), rev'g 
T.C. Memo 2001-128, in the Sixth Circuit stated that, "a SCIN signed by 
family members is presumed to be a gift and not a bona fide transaction." 
Id. at 597. The court stated that the presumption may be rebutted by 
showing that there existed at the time of the transaction a real expectation 
of repayment and intent to enforce the collection of the indebtedness, and 
. on the facts before it, the presumption had been rebutted. The taxpayer 
rebutted the presumption in Estate of Costqnza, but in this case, the Chief 
Counsel noted, the decedent did not need the stream of cash and used the 
SCIN arrangement as "a device to transfer the stock to other family 
members at· a substantially lower value than the fair mm·ket value of the 
stock." The Chief Counsel also concluded that it was not clear that there 
was a reasonable expectation that the debt would be repaid. The princi-
pal mnount on the notes exceeded the value of the assets sold to the trust, 
though the IRS did recognize that the trusts had some assets from the ini-
tial gifts, and thus the estate could m·gue that the notes were bona fide 
and that the trusts had sufficient assets to repay the loans. 
The Chief Counsel also dete1mined that D could not value the 
SCIN premium based strictly on the Section 7520 tables. The Chief 
Counsel stated that the Section 7520 tables should not apply to value 
SCIN notes, because Section 7520 . applies only to value "an annuity, 
any interest for life or term of years, or any remainder." The Chief 
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Counsel stated that the notes must be valued "based on a method that 
takes into account the willing-buyer willing-seller standard" and that 
"the decedent's life expectancy, taking into consideration decedent's 
medical history on the date of the gift, should be taken into account." 
Citing GCM 39503 (May 7, 1986). The IRS explained that, because of 
D's health, it was unlikely that the full amount ofthe note would ever be 
paid. Thus, the note was worth significantly less than its stated amount, 
and the difference between the note's fair market value and its stated 
an1ount constitutes a taxable gift. 
Note. The IRS was correct that there is a taxable gift if the value 
of the promissory notes is less than the value of the transfeiTed assets, and 
that the SCIN should be effective to remove the underlying assets from the 
seller's gross estate. It was incorrect, however, when it contended that the 
lack of an independent nontax pmpose for the transaction means that the 
SCIN should be disregarded, or that the Section 7520 tables are inapplica-
ble to determine the SCIN premium. 
With respect to the application of Section 7520, the IRS relies sole-
ly on GCM 39503, in which the IRS stated that: 
The value of the installment obligation and the property 
sold must be substantially equal. However, unlike the pri-
vate annuity, there is no requirement that the actuarial ta-
bles are to be used in .determining the gift taxation of in-
stallment sale. Thus, the taxpayer's particular health status 
may be considered, and there is more room to establish that 
the terms of the sale are reasonable. 
GCM 35903, however, predates Section 7520, which states that actuarial 
tables must be used to value an "annuity, any interest for life or a term of 
years, or any remainder or reversionary interest." Int. Rev. Code § 
7520(a). Section 7520 states that it must be used to value "an interest for 
life or a term of years," which precisely describes the payments under a 
SCIN. Furthermore, the IRS publication "Actuarial Values, Alpha Vol-
ume," which implements the IRS actuarial tables under Section 7520, in-
cludes an example that uses the tables to determine "the present worth of a 
temporary rumuity of $1.00 per annum payable annually for 10 years or 
until the prior death of a person aged 65 .... " This, too, appears to de-
scribe precisely the calculation of the premium for a SCIN. Thus, Section 
7520 appears to apply to the valuation of a SCIN premium. It may also be 
noteworthy that in Dallas v. Comm 'r, T.C. Memo. 2006-212 the IRS ap-
pears to have determined the value of a SCIN using the actuarial tables 
under Section 7520. 
Practitioners should generally use the actuarial tables under Sec-
tion 7520 to calculate the premium on a SCIN, but they should also be 
aware of the possibility that the IRS may challenge this calculation to the 
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extent that the seller's actual life expectancy is significantly different from 
his or her ac_tuariallife expectancy. · 
C. Code § 2518. Disclaimers 
Disclaimer of Pre-1977 Interests is Timely if Made Within a Reasonable 
Time Mter First Learning of the Existence of the Interest. PLR 201334001 
(Aug. 23, 2013) 
Grantor created four Trusts several years before his death before January 1; 1977. 
The tmsts were to provide for the lawful lineal descendants of Daughter, per stir-
pes. Daughter's son, Grandson, is the cunent beneficiary of the fom trusts. Upon 
Grandson's death, Grandson's son (Taxpayer) will be entitled to income distribu-
tions from Taxpayer's per stilpita1 share of Trusts. The income distributions will 
continue until the earlier of Taxpayer's death or the perpetuities date. Upon ter-
mination of each of the Trusts, any remaining trust property will be distributed to 
Ta'<payer and his brother, per stirpes. Taxpayer, who is over 18 years of age, rep-
resents that he learned of the transfers creating his interests in Trusts only on Date 
2 and that, until then, he did not even know that he had any interest in Trusts. 
Taxpayer proposed to disclaim his interests in Trusts on or before. Date 3, which 
is not more than nine months after Date 2. The disclaimers would be valid under 
applicable state law. 
The IRS stated that the disclaimers would be timely, even though made far 
after the date set by Section 2518 for a qualified disclaimer. Section 2518 re-
quires that a disclaimer of a transfer made after December 31, 1976, must be 
made within nine months of the date on which the transfer occurs, but disclaimers 
of transfers made before January 1, 1977 need only be made witl1in a reasonable 
time following the date the disclaimant first learns of the interest. See Jewett v. 
Comm'r, 455 U.S. 305 (1982). The IRS concluded that nin~ months was a rea-
sonable time after Taxpayer learned of the existence of the transfers, and that the 
disclaimer would be respected for estate and gift tax purposes. 
D~ Gift Tax Procedures 
Assets of Irrevocable Trust May Be Foreclosed Upon to Satisfy Grantor's 
Gift and Income Tax Deficiency, Because of Purchase-Money Resulting 
Trust. United States v. Tingey, 716 F.3d 1295 (lOth Cir. May 29, 2013), aff'g 
2011 WL 4889520, 108 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-6755 (D. Utah, 2011) 
In 1993, Douglas Brown created the Brown Family Tmst, an inevocable trust for 
himself, his wife, .and their four children. Douglas's brother-in-law, Robert 
Tingey, was named trustee. Douglas and his wife, Barbara, negotiated to buy a 
ski cabin. The seller conveyed undivided half interests in the cabin to two trusts 
that he created (the Jensen Trusts), and each of those tmsts then conveyed its in-
terest to Tingey, ·for the Family Trust. Douglas paid an earnest-money deposit, 
and then gave a cashier's check for the $72,000 down payment, and executed a 
$200,000 promissory note in favor of the Jensen Trusts. Douglas was the sole ob-
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ligor on the note, he executed a trust deed to the cabin as security, and he gave the 
Jensen Trusts as additional security a security interest in a snow-plowing machine· 
and a share of stock representing the water rights to the cabin. The lots were not 
marketable without the water rights. Douglas and Barbara began used the cabin 
without the trustee's permission, petformed maintenance work, and paid the utili-
ty bills and premiums on an insurance policy for the cabin issued in Douglas' 
name. Douglas later leased the cabin to a friend and instructed him to pay rent di-
rectly to the Jensen Trusts to be applied against the payments due on the note. 
The note payments were also satisfied from direct payments by Douglas and other 
sources closely connected with Douglas. 
·Douglas was fmmd to owe the IRS over $2 million in unpaid gift and in-
come tax:es, and the IRS attempted to foreclose on the sld cabin. · 
The U.S. District Court for Utah (Judge Jenldns) permitted the IRS to 
foreclose on federal tax liens on the ski cabin, despite the fact that it was titled in 
the name of the Family Trust and the taxes were owed by Douglas and·his wife. 
The court held that Douglas and Barbara were the beneficial owners of the cabin, 
because Douglas had a purchase-money resulting tmst arising from his having 
bought the cabin and then conveyed it to the tmst. 
The .U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Judge Hartz) affim1ed, 
by a two-to-one vote. The court noted that when Douglas created the Family 
Trust, his finances were already in a precarious state. Douglas owed almost 
$350,000 in income taxes for 1993 and filed no return. The next year he was sued 
by investors and the year after he was indicted for fmancial transgressions, but the 
claims and charges concerned misconduct beginning in late 1990. Douglas re-
tai1Ied significant control over the Family Trust's affairs: Tingey consulted with 
Douglas and relied on Douglas's knowledge of the investment industry in making 
decisions regarding trust assets, Douglas often presented Tingey with investment 
opportunities for the trust, and the trust was intimately intertwined with Douglas's 
business affairs. Tingey argued that (1) that the government waived the right to 
assert that Douglas and Barbara held the beneficial interest in the cabin, and (2) 
no purchase money resulting trust was created under state law. The court reject-
ed both arguments. -:r:he court held that there was no waiver, despite the stipulated 
order in Douglas's criminal securities-fraud case, that required that the proceeds 
of certain stock held by the Family Trust be forfeited to the United States as resti-
tution, and that lifted any further restraint on remaining trust property: Even if the 
government was fully aware of the Family Ttust's claims to the cabin, its agree-
ment to the stipulated order did not waive its rights to pursue a tax claim, because 
the order said nothing about tax liability or who had beneficial interests in the 
cabin. The court also held that there was a valid purchase money resulting trust 
under state law, noting that a purchase money resulting trust usually arises where 
a transfer of properties is made to one person and the purchase price is paid by 
another. Zion's First Nat'l Bank v. Fennmore (In re Estate of Hock), 655 P.2d 
1111 at 1115 (Utah 1982) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts§ 440 (1959)); 
accord Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 9(1) (2003). There is an exception where 
the transfer of property is made to donor's close family, as happened here, unless 
the one paying the purchase price intends that the transferee should have no bene-
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ficial interest in the property. In this case, the court stated that the record showed 
that Douglas, with the trustee's acquiescence, ignored the formalities of the trust 
in managing the property, making note payments out of personal funds that were 
not routed through the trust, taking care of maintenance, paying insurance premi-
ums (on a policy that was in Douglas's name), and renting out the cabin without 
the trustee's knowledge. Douglas had as much control ofthe property as he would 
have had if it had been in his own name, and he kept the title to the water rights in 
his name, malting the trust's asset unmarketable. Douglas lmew when he created 
the trust that he was accnring significant ta,"{ and civil liabilities, and he created 
the trust for asset protection purposes. An intent to shield assets from creditors 
can support the imposition of a pmchase money resulting trust. 
Chief Judge Br~scoe dissented, finding that the govenunent had not met its 
bmden to produce "clear and convincing" evidence that Douglas intended to re-
tain a beneficial interest in the cabin. The Chief Judge stated that he would re-
verse and remand for further proceedings to determine if the IRS can enforce a 
lien tmder its altemate theory of fraudulent transfer, which the district comt did 
not address. The Chief Judge argued that the purchase money resulting trust is 
not an eqtritable remedy designed to benefit creditors, but rather a remedy de-
signed to give effect to the purchaser's intent, and that the fact that Douglas made 
payments on the note cannot serve as evidence to rebut the presumption that Bar-
bara and the couple's children held the beneficial interest. Rather, he contended, 
the trustee1s co-signing the note supports the view that the Family Trust was the 
true beneficial owner, and that the parties anticipated that the trust would make 
future payments. An intent to protect assets from creditors is a factor in detennin-
ing whether we should impose a purchase money revocable trust, the Chief Judge 
agreed, but it is not the only factor. "[A] pmchaser could quite plausibly want to 
protect his assets and gift the property to Iris relatives." 2013 WL 2321656 at* 12. 
The Chief Judge stated that the evidence supporting a conclusion that Douglas in-
tended to retain a beneficial interest is ambiguous as to intent. There was no evi-
dence that the beneficiaries were unaware of their interest in the cabin, or that 
Douglas used it for his own purposes to the exclusion of the beneficiaries. Fur-
thermore, the trustee had long considered the cabin a trust asset, and Barbara and 
the children used the cabin for their own enjoyment. Also, none of the parties with 
knowledge of this transaction· has made an assertion explicitly contradicting the 
presumption that Douglas intended the cabin as a gift for his wife and the chil-
dren. 
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